Why good intentions weren’t enough, and why competence, compliance, and culture must work together.
Safety sits at a difficult intersection of engineering, human factors, behavioral science, and organizational management. That complexity makes our field uniquely vulnerable to promising slogans that spread faster than the evidence supporting them.
This article highlights several safety fads that once shaped corporate safety programs—and why many organizations are now shifting toward more evidence-based, competence-anchored approaches.
1. Heinrich’s Triangle as a Predictive SIF Model
Status:Widely questioned / mostly abandoned
Core claim: Reducing minor injuries proportionally reduces serious injuries
Why it spread: • Simple, intuitive ratio • Numerical justification for behavior programs • Easy for dashboards
Why it failed: • Empirically weak for SIF prediction • Focused attention on low-severity, high-frequency events • Distracted from high-energy, low-frequency hazards
What replaced it: • SIF-specific hazard models • Energy-based hazard frameworks • Barrier/controls-focused methods
2. Zero Injuries / Zero Harm as an Operational Target
Status:Now mostly framed as an aspiration
Core claim: Zero injuries is an achievable daily operating goal.
Why it spread: • Morally appealing • Strong leadership signaling • Simple emotional message
Why it failed: • Incentivized injury suppression • Penalized transparency • Implied denial of residual risk (contradicting all risk-matrix methods)
What replaced it: • SIF-focused leading indicators • Verification of critical controls • Explicit acknowledgment of residual risk
3. Behavior-Based Safety (BBS) as a “Silver Bullet”
Status:No longer marketed as a standalone system
Core claim: Unsafe acts are the primary cause of accidents; modifying behavior prevents most events.
Why it spread: • Borrowed credibility from behavioral psychology • Easy to scale as a corporate program • Produced short-term reductions in minor injuries
Why it failed: • Weak alignment with SIF prevention • Shifted attention from engineering, design, and planning • Reduced the role of technical SMEs • Encouraged “compliance theater” in some implementations • Tended to blame workers for systemic failures
What replaced it: • Use of BBS elements as supporting tools • SME-gated observations for high-risk work (common in aviation, surgery, high-voltage switching, crane operations, etc.) • Integration with engineering controls, permitting, and work design • Recognition that human error is often a symptom of system conditions
These replacements reflect the move toward Safety-II, Human Factors, and barrier-based thinking.
4. “No-Blame Culture” as Literal Policy
Status:Increasingly criticized
Core claim: Eliminating blame improves reporting and safety.
Why it spread: • Reaction to punitive practices • Believed to support near-miss reporting • Easy cultural message
Why it failed: • Incompatible with OSHA’s General Duty Clause and duty-of-care obligations • Legal liability remains regardless of slogans • Workers rarely report intentional violations • Removed accountability for design, planning, and resource decisions
What replaced it: • Just & Fair Culture frameworks • Differentiation between human error, at-risk behavior, and reckless violations • Clear accountability for system design, procedures, resources, and controls
5. “Safety Is Culture, Not Compliance”
Status:Viewed as a harmful false dichotomy
Core claim: Compliance is bureaucratic; culture is superior.
Why it spread: • Fit nicely into leadership culture narratives • Appealing alternative to technical detail • Aligned with “beyond compliance” rhetoric
Why it failed: • Compliance is mandatory—culture cannot replace it • Many “beyond compliance” organizations were not meeting minimum requirements • Culture without competence becomes belief-based, not evidence-based
What replaced it: • Competence–Compliance–Culture models • Recognition that:
- Culture must support compliance
- Compliance must be competence-driven
- Culture enhances—but never replaces—technical rigor
6. Injury-Rate Incentive Programs
Status:Largely abandoned or restricted
Core claim: Rewarding low injury rates improves safety.
Why it spread: • Easy metric • Visible leadership action • Apparent short-term improvements
Why it failed: • Encouraged under-reporting • Penalized transparency • OSHA explicitly cautioned against rate-based incentives • No relationship to SIF risk
What replaced it: • Incentives tied to:
- Hazard identification quality
- Corrective action completion
- Control verification
- Participation in learning and improvement
Regulators and industry now promote leading indicators, not outcome suppression.
7. Generic Leadership Walks Without Technical Content
Status:Increasingly questioned
Core claim: Leadership presence alone improves safety.
Why it spread: • Symbolic visibility • Easy to implement • Low technical requirement for executives
Why it failed: • Focus on surface-level observations • Scripted questions from non-SMEs • Minimal impact on safety-critical decisions
What replaced it: • SME-led assurance reviews • Leadership focus on:
- Resource allocation
- Critical control verification
- SME support
- Escalation pathways • Leaders enabling—not substituting for—expert judgment
8. “Beyond Compliance”
Status:Increasingly exposed as hollow rhetoric
Core claim: Organizations should go beyond regulatory minimums.
Why it spread: • Sounded progressive • Differentiated companies • Allowed avoidance of compliance gaps
Why it failed: • Often used by organizations not meeting minimum regulatory requirements • Measured program participation, not hazard control • Created “fad compliance” instead of technical compliance
What replaced it: • Demonstrated regulatory mastery • Evidence-based enhancements after compliance is met • Clear distinction between:
- Mandatory regulatory compliance as a minimum,
- Risk-based improvements beyond it
Closing Observation
Despite their differences, these fads are deficient for the same underlying reason:
They decoupled competence, compliance, and culture.
- Slogans replaced controls
- Belief systems replaced evidence
- Consensus replaced validation
- Career incentives outweighed field reality
- Non-SMEs made decisions about high-risk work
Good intentions were never the issue. But in high-hazard environments, good intentions must be matched with competence-driven compliance and SME-led decision-making.
That’s where safety becomes durable, predictable, and defensible.